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A B S T R A C T
Time of use (TOU) tariﬀs, if widely adopted, could help make electricity more secure, clean and aﬀordable.
However, quite little is known about whether consumers will switch to a TOU tariﬀ or what might increase
uptake if switching rates are lower than required. This paper presents the results of a systematized review and
meta-analysis combining the results of 66 measures of uptake to a variety of TOU tariﬀs across 27 studies
conducted in six countries. It provides the ﬁrst robust estimate of consumer demand and correlates of demand for
TOU tariﬀs that is not based on the results from just a single study or tariﬀ. Four main conclusions emerge. First,
if consumers are left to opt-in to TOU tariﬀs, uptake could be as low as 1% unless eﬀorts are made to close the
intention-action gap, otherwise enrolment could reach 43%. Second, if enrolment is opt-out, uptake could ap-
proach 100%. Third, whilst national surveys indicate the potential appetite for TOU tariﬀs in a population, they
are insuﬃcient for predicting future TOU tariﬀ adoption rates; the median proportion of domestic energy bill
payers who say they would be willing to switch to a TOU tariﬀ in national surveys is ﬁve times higher than the
median enrolment rate to TOU tariﬀs oﬀered by utilities. Fourth, real-time pricing tariﬀs, in which the price of
electricity varies freely throughout the day, are less popular than static TOU tariﬀs which have ﬁxed peak and
oﬀ-peak rates. This paper discusses the limitations of opt-out enrolment for TOU tariﬀs and presents results
suggesting that small upfront payments, bill protection and automation are promising alternative methods of
increasing opt-in enrolment. Policymakers and researchers should now consider how recruitment will be per-
formed, weighing up the beneﬁts to society as a whole against the distributional impacts for individuals and
groups.
1. Introduction
Encouraging domestic consumers to change the time of day at which
they use electricity is a key part of many governments’ plans to ensure
national energy supplies are secure and aﬀordable in the transition
towards greater penetration of intermittent renewable energy sources
and the electriﬁcation of heat and transport [1]. One way in which
consumers will be incentivised to change their consumption patterns is
through price signals delivered via time of use (TOU) electricity tariﬀs,
in which the price of electricity varies depending on factors such as
electricity network constraints and the wholesale price of electricity. A
large body of literature demonstrates that consumers will alter their
consumption patterns in response to a range of TOU tariﬀs, with an
average reduction in peak time energy consumption of around 15%
depending on the tariﬀ design [2], see also [3,4] and, in particular, [5]
which reviews 30 trials on the impact of TOU tariﬀs on electricity de-
mand. An underlying assumption of many of these studies, including
government decarbonisation strategies, is that consumers will vo-
luntarily sign up to a TOU tariﬀ in the ﬁrst place. However, the evi-
dence on level of consumer demand for TOU tariﬀs is far less clear.
Whilst TOU electricity pricing has been an established part of grid
management strategies involving large industrial and commercial users
for many years, domestic TOU programmes remain restricted to rela-
tively basic legacy options such as Economy 7 tariﬀs [6] in Great Britain
(GB), or the Tempo Tariﬀ in France [7]. Aside from the United States,
where more modern TOU tariﬀs are now commercially available, there
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is therefore no useful measure of current commercial consumer demand
for TOU tariﬀs.1 Alternative sources of evidence on consumer demand
for TOUs include recruitment rates into TOU ﬁeld trials and measures of
stated demand elicited from survey participants. However, to our
knowledge, there has been no attempt to synthesise the evidence from
this wide range of sources to provide an overall estimate of the likely
uptake of TOUs amongst domestic energy bill payers.
Further, if consumer uptake is lower than required – as our initial
analysis of consumer behavior in the energy market suggests it could be
– evidence is also required on what recruitment strategies and enabling
technologies are likely to be most eﬀective at increasing uptake. For
example, in the behavioural science literature, a large body of research
documents the way in which enrolment rates to various services and
products are higher when people are enrolled automatically, with the
option to unenroll (‘opt-out’), as opposed to when people must take
active steps to sign up (‘opt-in’). Notable examples are workplace
pension schemes, green energy tariﬀs and organ donor registration
[8–11]. Some TOU tariﬀ ﬁeld trials enrolled participants onto TOU
tariﬀs by default, unless consumers opted-out, whereas others relied on
consumers actively deciding to opt-in, presenting an opportunity to
understand which method may be more successful at stimulating up-
take. In addition, some studies provided participants with assistive
technologies, usually smart thermostats that customers could pro-
gramme to lower set-points during the higher peak time price periods.
Such technologies may also make TOU tariﬀs more, or even less, de-
sirable, depending on how these technologies are perceived. Moreover,
there are many diﬀerent types of tariﬀs for which the price of electricity
varies throughout the day, and some tariﬀ designs may be more ap-
pealing to consumers than others. Five key time-varying tariﬀ designs
are:
• Static TOU. Prices vary during the day in a ﬁxed and regular way,
for example by having a peak price between 4 and 8 p.m. on
weekdays, and an oﬀ-peak price at other times.
• Dynamic TOU (DP). Price points are ﬁxed, but the times at which
they apply vary from day to day. For example, there may be low,
medium, and high price periods, and customers are notiﬁed in ad-
vance between which times those prices will apply,
• Real-time pricing (RTP). Prices vary in real-time (e.g. to the hour or
half hour) depending on the current wholesale cost of electricity.
• Critical peak pricing (CPP). Pricing is mostly ﬂat, but there are oc-
casional high price ‘events’ of which customers are notiﬁed in ad-
vance.
• Critical peak rebates (CPR), also known as peak time rebates.
Pricing is ﬂat, but at certain times (notiﬁable in advance) customers
are rewarded for reducing their electricity demand compared to
some agreed amount.
For simplicity, this paper adopts the convention of using the term
‘time of use’ tariﬀ (here, abbreviated to TOU tariﬀ) as a generic term to
refer to a whole spectrum of time-varying tariﬀs, including both static
and dynamic pricing options.2
This paper presents the design and results of a systematized litera-
ture review [12] aimed at answering ﬁve main review questions:
• How much domestic consumer demand is there for TOU tariﬀs?
• Does domestic consumer demand for TOU tariﬀs vary by tariﬀ de-
sign?
• Does domestic consumer demand for TOU tariﬀs vary according to
the presence of automation technologies?
• Does domestic consumer demand for TOU tariﬀs vary by the way in
which the tariﬀ is framed to consumers, such as whether the choice
is opt-in rather than opt-out?
• Is there cross-country variation in demand for TOU tariﬀs?
This systematized review uses methods from a systematic review,
including the use of a review protocol in which the search strategy,
inclusion/exclusion criteria and extraction methods are determined in
advance. However, like a rapid review, the completeness of searching
was determined by resource constraints [12]. This review also includes
a meta-analysis, “which statistically combines the results of quantita-
tive studies to provide a more precise estimate of the results” [12], p. 94
to answer the research questions above. The review provides evidence
from six countries, covering Australia, France, Norway, Netherlands,
United Kingdom and the United States.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the
method used to conduct the systematized review, including the search
strategy and screening criteria as well as the extraction and synthesis of
the uptake measures. Section 3 presents the results of the search and
synthesis used to obtain a measure of overall uptake and uptake by
country, tariﬀ design, framing etc. in a meta-analysis. Section 4 dis-
cusses the strength of the evidence for consumer demand for TOU tariﬀs
in light of the limitations of the original study designs and the review-
level limitations (e.g. incomplete retrieval of relevant research) before
concluding, in Section 5, with an overall recommended ‘best’ estimate
of consumer demand for TOU tariﬀs and the key research gaps. The
reporting of the design and results follows the PRISMA check-list [13]
for reporting items for systematic reviews (mostly used in medical re-
search) as closely as possible.
2. Method – a systematized review
2.1. Criteria for considering studies for this review
A review protocol was prepared in advance of conducting the re-
view (see additional online material). We included studies written in
the English language that document empirical, quantitative ﬁndings on
switching rates to commercially available tariﬀs or hypothetical sign up
rates, elicited in surveys, to TOU tariﬀs amongst domestic energy
consumers in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries.
The following types of report were excluded:
• Studies that documented qualitative ﬁndings only, because these
types of studies could not be used to provide a quantitative measure
of uptake.
• Studies that did not report empirical results (e.g. include only
modelled uptake), because these studies would either be reliant on
an empirical measure which our inclusion criteria would capture or
would be based on targets or estimated optimum uptake levels,
neither of which are equivalent to actual consumer demand.
• Studies that did not report research including a TOU (e.g. which
focused only on direct load control or other non price-based de-
mand-side response).
• Studies focused exclusively on the non-domestic sector.
• Studies reporting work conducted in non-OECD countries, because it
was judged that such countries may have diﬀerent priorities and
concerns related to electricity usage (e.g. in developing countries,
particularly energy access) that would make such research better
suited to a separate review.
Studies reporting uptake measures based only on study recruitment
1We exclude countries such as Italy which have made time of use tariﬀs
mandatory since mandatory enrolment rates do not provide evidence of con-
sumer demand.
2 Although this is a conventional use of the terminology, sometimes the term
‘time of use’ tariﬀ (here, abbreviated to TOU tariﬀ) is used to refer to a speciﬁc
type of time-varying tariﬀ design that has a peak and oﬀ-peak price at the same
time of the day or week; following the conventions in the literature on demand-
side response, we refer to this sub-group of TOU tariﬀs as a static TOU tariﬀ (see
bulleted list).
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were also initially excluded (in the review protocol). However, the
decision was later taken to include such studies where they aimed to
recruit at a large scale (similar to a commercial product oﬀering) in
order to provide a greater range of evidence based on studies in which
people are actually able to switch to the tariﬀ having made the decision
to switch (unlike in survey research). The full inclusion/exclusion cri-
teria are summarised in Table A.1 in the appendix.
2.2. Search methods for identiﬁcation of studies
An initial list of ﬁve recent publications on consumer demand for
TOUs was identiﬁed [14–18] as a basis to generate keywords for elec-
tronic searches (Table 1). The reference lists of these publications were
also checked and publications with titles that suggested they may ﬁt the
screening criteria were saved for further review. Forward citation
checks were also conducted using Google Scholar to identify documents
referencing these publications, which were saved for later review if the
titles were deemed to ﬁt the screening criteria above. Using a ‘snow-
balling’ approach, reference lists of documents that pass screening cri-
teria were also accessed for inclusion.
The following bibliographic databases were searched:
• Scopus
• Web of Science (all databases)
• ACM Digital Library
• IEEE Xplore
Searches were also developed based on the above search terms for
the websites of the following organisations:
• UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy
• Ofgem (GB energy regulator)
• Citizens Advice (GB consumer body)
• Sustainability First
• National Grid
• European Commission Research and Innovation (Energy)
• US Department of Energy (including SciTech Connect)
• Websites of UK and US academic institutions (URLs including
“.ac.uk” and “.edu”)
• ECEEE and ACEEE summer study proceedings
The focus on US organisations was motivated on the basis that the
US has a relatively advanced market in demand-side response and,
based on past research, were known to have undertaken a number of
relevant studies that were not all published in academic journals. The
additional focus on UK institutions was driven by a similar knowledge
about the UK's research on consumer uptake to TOU tariﬀs as well as by
the requirements of a wider project of which this review formed part.
By choosing to focus the search on global bibliographic databases, UK,
EU and US institutions and international conferences we aimed to
maximize coverage given the availability of resources. These choices
are considered when weighing up the external validity of the results.
Searches were recorded and reported to aid replicability (see addi-
tional online material) with potential sources saved in the reference
management software Mendeley.
2.3. Study selection
Results were screened on the basis of title and abstract according to
the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined above (also summarised in
Table 2). No exclusions were made on the basis of the design of the
empirical study, for example, whether experimental or non-experi-
mental.3 Screening was initially conducted in parallel by two screeners
until high levels of agreement were reached in the EPPI-Reviewer
software abstracts (review author initials: MF and GH]). Subsequent
screening on title/abstract was performed by a single screener abstracts
(review author initials: MF). Included items were then screened again
on the full document. The list of ﬁnal documents for inclusion were
reviewed by the authors following screening, with publications known
to be relevant but which were not present subjected to the same
screening as above, and included if they passed the screening criteria.
Table 1
Search terms used in conducting the search with example search string for use
in Scopus.
Time of use Uptake
Concept Time of use tariﬀs Uptake
Time-varying tariﬀs Consumer
Oﬀ peak tariﬀs Acceptability/acceptance
Dynamic pricing Switching
Cost-reﬂective tariﬀs Preferences
Critical peak pricing/rebates
Peak-time rebates
Real-time pricing
Search term “time of use” uptake
“time-of-use” consumer*
“time-varying” accept*
“oﬀ peak” switch*
dynamic W/2 pric* OR
tariﬀ*
preference*
“cost-reﬂective”
“critical peak”
“peak-time”/peaktime
“real-time pric*”/realtime
Scopus
example
TITLE-ABS-KEY("time of use" OR "time-of-use" OR "time-varying"
OR "oﬀ peak" OR (dynamic W/2 pric* OR tariﬀ*) OR "cost-
reﬂective" OR "critical peak" OR "peak-time" OR peaktime OR "real-
time pric*" OR "realtime pric*") AND TITLE-ABS-KEY(uptake OR
consumer* OR accept* OR switch* OR preference*) AND ALL(tariﬀ
OR pric*) AND ALL (energy OR electr*)
Table 2
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for review screening.
Include if source Exclude if source
Is in English Is not in English
Reports ﬁndings from empirical research or evaluation. Does not report empirical results (e.g. includes only modelled uptake), or
ﬁndings on uptake are based on study recruitment.
Includes quantitative ﬁndings that can help to inform estimation of tariﬀ uptake rates. Reports only qualitative ﬁndings.
Reports research designed to enable estimation of the degree of consumers’ expressed or
demonstrated willingness to sign up (hypothetically or in reality) to at least one TOU tariﬀ
design, and the reasons associated with this.
Does not report research including a TOU tariﬀ (for example, focused only on
direct load control or other non-price-based demand response product).
Reports work conducted in an OECD country. Reports work conducted in a non-OECD country.
Is focused on the domestic sector. Is focused on the non-domestic sector.
3Whilst it would be standard practice to exclude studies without a control
group in systematized reviews in the medical literature, since this paper is not
assessing the causal eﬀectiveness of an intervention, it was considered un-
necessary to exclude studies on this basis.
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2.4. Data extraction
All sources included were coded in EPPI-Reviewer for the following
key characteristics:
• Geographical location of study
• Whether air conditioning was a signiﬁcant load
• Study start year
• Method of assessing uptake (survey, commercial product, trial re-
cruitment, other)
• Experimental design
• Type(s) of TOU tariﬀ(s) tested and their characteristics
• Organisation(s) administering the study
• Organisation(s) oﬀering (or framed as oﬀering) the TOU tariﬀ(s)
• Characteristics of sample receiving the TOU intervention
● Size
● Sampling method – participant characteristics, recruitment
method (opt-in, opt-out/framing)
● Whether an incentive was given to participants
● Whether bill protection was included
• Type(s) of outcome(s) measured by the intervention (including
measure/proxy of uptake/responsiveness and customer satisfaction)
• Role of automating technology
• Whether an ongoing satisfaction assessment was conducted
• Reported outcome(s), key interpretations and main conclusions
Extraction was conducted by a single reviewer in EPPI-Reviewer
abstracts (review author initials: MN). Not all studies reported uptake
and so this had to be computed, where possible, from the information
provided.4 Studies from which it was not possible to compute or obtain
a measure of uptake were excluded at this point too. Report tables were
compiled using EPPI-Reviewer in MS Word format from which a second
extraction was undertaken to transpose key characteristics required for
numerical analysis into MS Excel.5
2.5. Data synthesis
To compute an overall measure of uptake to TOU tariﬀs, uptake
measures that were not already expressed as a proportion were con-
verted into proportions in MS Excel. This involved converting measures
obtained from Likert scale type responses into binary variables, in
which the proportion of participants choosing a Likert scale point above
neutral6 were coded as switchers.
Once the primary outcome variable was coded consistently across
studies, a meta-analysis was undertaken. Meta-analysis is most com-
monly used to aggregate results of clinical trials and the standard de-
ﬁnition of meta-analysis reﬂects this: “meta-analysis is a statistical
methodology that integrates the results of several independent clinical
trials that are considered by the analyst to be “combinable”” (Huque
[1988] cited in Kontapantelis and Reeves [19]). Meta-analysis is a two-
stage process, the ﬁrst of which involves providing an appropriate
summary statistic for each study and the second in which the statistics
are combined to obtain an overall average eﬀect [19,20].
For the ﬁrst stage, we computed the mean and median uptake level
for the overall sample and the mean uptake, with the lower and upper
95% conﬁdence interval for the mean uptake, grouped by the following
factors from our research questions: type of study, tariﬀ design,
country, framing, presence of bill protection, presence of automation
and additional ﬁnancial incentive (the latter factor excluded survey
based measures, where incentives are used to compensate participants
for the time taken to complete the survey and are not used to attract
people onto the tariﬀ itself). These summary statistics were obtained by
importing the MS Excel ﬁle into the statistical software package Stata.
For the second stage, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)7 regression was
used to test whether there were statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
uptake rates across these factors using the following equation:
γ α β θ β μ β χ δ εis is is s is is is is s is= + + + + + (1)
where γis is a proportion ranging from 0.0 to 1.00 for each uptake
measure i in study s. The constant, αis, equals the average uptake to a
TOU tariﬀ across each measure i and study s conditional on the cov-
ariates θs, μis and χis. The covariate θs is a dummy variable in which the
value 1 is assigned to an uptake measure i from a study s that reports
willingness to switch to a TOU tariﬀ from a survey experiment and the
value zero if the uptake measure is from a study that reports the par-
ticipant recruitment rate into a TOU tariﬀ trial or uptake to a com-
mercially available tariﬀ. This is included in all speciﬁcations because it
is assumed that the method of measuring uptake will aﬀect the size of
uptake y. μis is a dummy variable in which the value 1 is assigned to an
uptake measure i from a study s in which enrolment was opt-out and 0
if it was opt-in. This is included in all speciﬁcations because the re-
search on opt-in versus opt-out enrolment suggests that opt-out enrol-
ment rates are substantially diﬀerent to opt-in rates.
To estimate the relative contribution that each covariate makes to
explaining the variation in γ , each covariate represented by χis in the
equation above is introduced separately, in independent regression
analyses in which χis is respectively; a dummy variable or a series of
dummy variables indicating whether the uptake measure i from a study
s run in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Australia, Norway or France, in
which the United States is the omitted dummy and therefore the re-
ference category; a series of dummy variables indicating whether the
uptake measure i from study s relates to a capacity pricing8 tariﬀ, a
critical peak rebate tariﬀ, a dynamic TOU tariﬀ, real-time pricing tariﬀ,
static TOU tariﬀ combined with critical peak pricing, a static tariﬀ
combined with real time pricing, an inverse static TOU tariﬀ (in which
the peak rate is overnight rather than during the day), a static TOU
tariﬀ plus a static TOU tariﬀ combined with critical peak pricing and a
static TOU tariﬀ plus a static TOU combined with critical peak pricing
and a critical peak rebate,9 in which a static TOU tariﬀ (in which the
4 For example, a tariﬀ trial might report the total number of participants
solicited for participation under a description of recruitment strategy and also
the total number of enrolled participants, when discussing the main eﬀects of
the tariﬀ on energy consumption. Alternatively, a study might report the total
number of customers enrolled on a commercially available tariﬀ on oﬀer to all
French consumers, in which case the recruitment rate can be inferred from the
population of France.
5 Full extracted tables are available on request from the corresponding au-
thor.
6 For example, on a 5-point Likert scale in which 1 is not willing to switch and
5 is strongly willing to switch, participants who selected 4 or 5 were coded as
switchers.
7 OLS regression was selected because parametric tests such as OLS have
greater statistical power than non parametric tests and, despite the small
sample size small, kernel density plots show that the data does not deviate
substantially from a normal distribution and econometric textbooks ﬁnd that
OLS generates unbiased and eﬃcient results even when the underlying dis-
tribution is not perfectly normal.
8 Capacity pricing tariﬀs charge customers for the demand in kilowatts (kw)
rather than consumption in kilowatt hours (kWh) such that the customers’ bill is
determined by the maximum amount of electricity used at any point during the
billing period. Although capacity pricing tariﬀs are therefore diﬀerent from the
other types of TOU tariﬀs discussed in this paper, they are included here where
they form part of wider TOU trials – but they were note explicitly sought. Their
inclusion is merited because such tariﬀs aim to achieve some of the aims of
demand-response, namely to minimise unpredictable peaks in electricity de-
mand during any billing period.
9 The penultimate two categories contain multiple tariﬀs because the study
from which the measure of uptake was drawn enrolled participants into a trial
in which they would have been randomly assigned to diﬀerent types of tariﬀs.
As such, the measure of uptake cannot be disaggregated by tariﬀ type but in-
stead arguably reﬂects a persons’ willingness to participate in a trial in which
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peak rate is during the day rather than overnight) is the omitted dummy
variable and therefore the reference category against which the coef-
ﬁcient β on each covariate should be compared; a dummy variable
indicating whether the uptake measure i was from a study s in which
the tariﬀ was framed to potential consumers as being able to save them
money (a money frame), and zero otherwise, excluding studies in which
it was not possible to identify what framing was used; a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the uptake measure i was from a study s in
which the tariﬀ was framed to potential consumers as being able to save
them money and help the environment (an environmental frame), and
zero otherwise, excluding studies in which it was not possible to
identify what framing was used; a dummy variable in which the value 1
is assigned to a measure of uptake i in study s in which the tariﬀ was
accompanied by bill protection and zero otherwise; a dummy variable
in which the value 1 is assigned to a measure of uptake i in study s in
which participants were oﬀered an upfront cash payment and zero
otherwise, excluding uptake measures from all survey experiments10; a
dummy variable in which the value 1 is assigned to a measure of uptake
i in study s in which the tariﬀ was accompanied by an automation
device that allows consumers to remotely adjust their electrical devices
in response to the price or which allows a third party, usually the
supplier, to do so on their behalf. The term δs is a ﬁxed eﬀect for each
study s from which the measure of uptake iwas taken, implemented as a
series of dummy variables for each study.
Fixed eﬀects are included because Ordinary Least Squares regres-
sion assumes that uptake measures are identically and independently
distributed across studies. However, this is unlikely to be true because
many uptake measures are recorded from the same studies, and uptake
measures from the same study are likely to be correlated because they
are based on the same population, same tariﬀs and so on. One option is
to cluster standard errors at the study level, however this only controls
for the average correlation in uptake measures within studies rather
than speciﬁc intra-cluster correlation for each study. Including ﬁxed
eﬀects for each study adjusts standard error estimates for speciﬁc intra-
cluster correlation.11 Studies did not report uptake by diﬀerent popu-
lation sub-groups to enable meaningful analysis of heterogeneity across
factors such as age and income. The alpha value is set at the conven-
tional level of p < 0.05. However, we also interpret results at lower
conﬁdence levels, using conﬁdence intervals, to assess whether it is
more likely than not that a particular factor is correlated with uptake.12
3. Results
3.1. Results of the search
Fig. 1 describes how the references identiﬁed through the searches
were processed for this review. A total of 41 documents were marked
for inclusion. During extraction, two subsequent studies [21,22] were
added that were not already included because the authors recognized
their absence and knew that they met the screening criteria, and 13
studies were excluded because they either did not report a measure of
uptake or because insuﬃcient information was provided to compute a
measure of uptake. During synthesis, a further three studies [18,21,23]
were excluded because the sources did not provide information on the
distribution of responses across the Likert scale measure of uptake to
compute the proportion of switchers. This left a total of 27 studies for
analysis covering 66 individual measures of uptake to a TOU tariﬀ.13
3.2. Characteristics of included studies
Fig. 2 presents a heat map of the key characteristics of the studies
included in which the size of the square represents the number of
measures corresponding to the level of each factor. As can be seen, the
majority of the evidence on consumer demand for TOU tariﬀs is from
the United States; of the 66 measures of uptake included for analysis, 25
are from the United States, 15 from Australia, 15 from Great Britain, 8
from the Netherlands, 2 from France and 1 from Norway. Apart from
Fig. 1. PRISMA ﬂow diagram of review process.
(footnote continued)
they could be enrolled on any of the tariﬀs.
10 Cash incentives are usually provided to compensate people for the in-
convenience of participating in a trial or to attract consumers to participate in a
trial or to sign up to a tariﬀ; in surveys, cash is used as payment for undertaking
the survey so it does not serve the same purpose and would not be appropriate
to consider it as such.
11 An alternative method for accounting for nested data is to use the random
eﬀects estimator however study eﬀects are unlikely to be random because
studies were not randomly sampled from a larger population of studies. On the
contrary, the systematized review design used means that studies were pur-
posively sampled on the basis that they met speciﬁc inclusion criteria.
12 This is justiﬁed on the basis that the p-value is a continuous variable
which, if interpreted as such, can provide a more informative or nuanced ac-
count of the likelihood that any given result is true. This is because, “In the
same way that a small P value does not guarantee that there is a real eﬀect, a P
value just above 0.05 does not mean no eﬀect.”[57, p. 1], particularly if the
independent variable of interest has a low prevalence in the population or has a
small eﬀect on the dependent variable of interest given the sample size.
13 Some studies ran multiple trial arms so provide multiple methods of up-
take.
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Great Britain and the United States, the evidence on all countries comes
from a single study.
The majority of the evidence relates to uptake to static TOU tariﬀs
and is based on stated willingness to switch to tariﬀs, as measured
amongst participants in specially commissioned surveys, as opposed to
uptake rates to commercially available tariﬀs or the proportion of
participants who agreed to go onto a TOU tariﬀ as part of their parti-
cipation in an academic trial. Of the 12 measures that are based on the
proportion of consumers signing up to a commercially available TOU,
nine are from the United States, two are from France (EDF Tempo, EDF
TOU) and one is from GB (Economy 7).
Most of the measures of uptake are based on opt-in rather than opt-
out recruitment methods, and very few used bill protection or an ad-
ditional participant ﬁnancial incentive to encourage uptake. The pre-
dominant way in which TOU tariﬀs in the sample were framed to
consumers is to emphasise that TOU tariﬀs can save money, and just a
Fig. 2. Characteristics of the studies included in the review.
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small number of measures (n= 2) are also drawn from studies which
emphasised the environmental beneﬁts. No other ways of framing the
tariﬀs were used.
3.3. Risk of bias in included studies?
The Cochrane Collaboration's ‘Risk of Bias’ tool suggests that bias be
considered along ﬁve domains - selection, performance, attrition, de-
tection, reporting – and an ‘other bias’ category to capture threats to
internal validity. Risk of bias was not assessed during the review but is
being assessed here. Detection bias is a problem in this review insofar as
that the review only included reports written in English, so our ﬁgures
may be more representative of English speaking OECD countries, which
is a relatively minority of the 35 OECD countries. Screening of web-
pages was only performed for UK organisations which could also lead to
detection bias.
3.4. Results of individual studies – overall consumer demand for TOU tariﬀs
and other relevant factors
The variation in mean uptake to TOU tariﬀs is large, ranging from a
mean of 0–96%. The mean enrolment rate is 29% with a standard de-
viation almost as large (sd=24%) and the median enrolment rate is
27%. The variation in uptake across studies may be explained by a
number of factors, including study type, country and tariﬀ design, as
identiﬁed by the research questions.
Table 3 presents a breakdown of the mean and median14 uptake
according to these factors, sorted in descending order of the mean (with
the exception of the yes/no/unknown questions), with the lower and
upper 95% conﬁdence intervals also presented. For some measures,
uptake is taken from studies in which participants were randomly as-
signed to one of two TOU tariﬀs (e.g. static TOU or static TOU com-
bined with critical peak pricing) so uptake cannot be disaggregated by
tariﬀ type and is therefore presented as uptake for two or more tariﬀ
types.
The most notable diﬀerences in uptake are those between study type
and recruitment method, whether opt-in versus opt-out, a relationship
which is made clearer in Fig. 3, which is a bar chart of the mean uptake
to any TOU tariﬀ for each of the 66 measures of uptake obtained across
the 27 studies. With just one exception [24], the highest measures of
uptake are recorded from studies using opt-out recruitment [25–27]
and studies using willingness to switch as a proxy for potential uptake
[15,22,28–30]. Although the mean uptake for commercial tariﬀs is
lower in magnitude than recruitment rates for trials the diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant (p=0.490) which is why these are grouped
together with measures from commercial tariﬀs.
As a result, all analyses include controls for whether the study is a
survey and whether enrolment is opt-out, with the results presented in
Table 3. The coeﬃcients in Table 3 are a product of a series of linear
regressions in which uptake is the dependent variable measured as a
proportion from 0.0 to 1.00 and diﬀerent factors are the independent
variables. Since an analysis of variance test reveals that the intra-cluster
correlation is 0.47 which is high and demonstrates that it is not ap-
propriate to assume that the error term is independently distributed,
ﬁxed eﬀects are used in nearly all analyses. Note that, study ﬁxed ef-
fects will also penalise results that are strongly dependent on results
from a single or very few studies and which may therefore be less re-
liable than results from multiple studies (however, conversely, the ﬁxed
eﬀects could also mask eﬀects that are constant across studies, which
may therefore be reliable results, which is why we use and interpret
results which include these eﬀects carefully).
Throughout columns (1) to (9) in which a range of control variables
are added, uptake measures elicited from surveys are consistently es-
timated as being between 28% and 36% points higher than uptake to
commercially available TOU tariﬀs or tariﬀs people were able to sign up
to in trials, after controlling for intra-cluster correlation between
measures obtained from the same surveys using ﬁxed eﬀects. Opt-out
enrolment is estimated as being consistently 70% points higher, after
controlling for intra-cluster correlation. When both measures are in-
putted into the regression analysis, the model estimates that they ex-
plain 85% of the variation in uptake to TOU tariﬀs (column 1, Table 4).
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in uptake between countries, but
when study type is controlled for the only signiﬁcant remaining dif-
ference is between the UK and Australia (p < 0.05). As the Australian
evidence is drawn from a single study, this is most likely due to speciﬁc
Table 3
Average uptake to TOU tariﬀs by study design, country, tariﬀ design, default
frame, beneﬁt frame, bill protection, additional ﬁnancial incentive and auto-
mation.
Factor and level Mean (%) Median (%) Lower 95%
conﬁdence
interval (%)
Upper 95%
conﬁdence
interval (%)
N
Study type:
Survey 37 36 31 43 34
Trial recruitment 23 12 10 36 20
Commercial sign
up
17 7 1 33 12
Country:
Australia 51 54 46 56 15
UK 30 30 22 37 15
US 25 9 10 35 25
Norway 25 25 – – 1
France 19 19 – – 2
Netherlands 14 13 4 25 8
Tariﬀ design:
Static + (Static
+ CPP)
+CPR
44 44 – – 2
CPR 53 53 14 70 5
CAP 39 37 23 36 3
Static 35 35 24 46 22
CPP 28 21 12 43 10
DP 22 25 8 36 5
RTP 17 5 2 33 10
Static + RTP 12 12 – – 1
Static + CPP 9 6 – – 4
Static + (Static
+ CPP)
3 3 24 36 1
Static inverse 1 1 – – 1
Default frame:
Opt-out 83 87 57 108 3
Opt-in 26 25 21 32 62
Beneﬁt frame:
Money &
Environment
36 36 36 36 2
Money 30 23 22 37 48
Unknown 26 26 14 38 16
Bill protection
Yes 35 32 16 53 12
No 27 28 21 33 49
Unknown 35 25 – – 5
Additional
ﬁnancial
incentive:
Yes 35 36 28 41 35
No 20 12 10 30 27
Unknown 37 26 – – 4
Automation:
Yes 31 28 16 46 15
No 32 33 25 39 33
Unknown 18 7 4 31 7
Note: Due to small sample sizes it was not possible to compute conﬁdence in-
tervals for all the variables recorded; these cells are marked with a dash to
indicate that they are intentionally left blank.
14 The median is also presented given that, for some variables, the distribu-
tion is highly skewed due to the large variation in uptake measures.
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design considerations of this individual study.
There appears to be substantial variation in average uptake de-
pending on tariﬀ design in the raw data (Table 2). The regression model
estimates that real time pricing tariﬀs are correlated with a 13% lower
level of uptake when compared to a static TOU tariﬀ (p < 0.01), when
controlling for recruitment method, whether uptake was measured in a
survey and for correlation in uptake measures recorded within the same
studies (column 3). The most highly speciﬁed model (column 3) also
estimates that static TOU tariﬀs are preferred to capacity pricing
(p < 0.001) and marginally statistically signiﬁcantly more popular
than dynamic pricing tariﬀs (p < 0.10). No other diﬀerences are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. This is possibly due to the low sample size for these
other tariﬀ designs. When regression analysis is run with only the dif-
ferent tariﬀ designs as control variables (column 4), the adjusted R-
Squared value indicates that tariﬀ design explains 9% of the variation in
uptake, which is lower than for the other factors considered so far.
There is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in uptake across
measures of uptake obtained from studies in which people were told
about the potential ﬁnancial savings from switching tariﬀ (p= 1.000)
or the ﬁnancial and environmental beneﬁts (p= 1.000).
Oﬀering people bill protection (p=0.184) does not appear to have
a statistically signiﬁcant impact on uptake (column 7), however it does
once removing the ﬁxed eﬀects which control for correlation in uptake
across studies (p < 0.05) which is likely to be reﬂective of the fact that
only very few studies tested bill protection and all had relatively high
levels of uptake (for brevity, results not reported in Table 3).
Providing people with upfront ﬁnancial payments for signing up to a
TOU tariﬀ either in trials or for commercial oﬀerings (survey measures
excluded) has a strong statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on uptake
(p < 0.001) regardless of whether the speciﬁcation controls for cor-
relation in uptake within studies (p < 0.01).
Some TOU tariﬀs are accompanied by automation devices (usually
smart thermostats which customers can use to remotely control their
space heating and cooling e.g. to avoid peak times) but the data sug-
gests that uptake is not related to the presence of automation
(p=0.958), even after removing controls for intra-cluster correlation
(p=0.158).15 In further exploratory analyses, not reported in Table 3,
automation was also not found to have any eﬀect on uptake to real time
pricing tariﬀs or dynamic tariﬀs (p= 0.502) or real-time pricing tariﬀs
on their own (p= 0.299).
4. Discussion
4.1. Demand for TOU tariﬀs
Median uptake to a TOU tariﬀ across 66 individual measures of
uptake and 27 unique studies is 27%. However, the variation in uptake
is huge – the standard deviation around the mean is almost as large as
the mean itself (24%), with a range in uptake measures of 0–96%. The
results in Table 3 suggest this is most likely to be driven by variation in
the way in which uptake is measured in studies as well as whether
people were recruited to the tariﬀ by default or via opt-in enrolment.
Notably, the median proportion of domestic energy bill payers who say
they would be willing to switch to a TOU tariﬀ in national surveys is
ﬁve times higher as the median enrolment rate to commercially avail-
able TOU tariﬀs. The higher uptake rate in survey research is consistent
with the theoretical literature on the gap between behavioural inten-
tions and behavioural action from psychology [31] and stated and re-
vealed preferences in economics [32]. Together, method of measure-
ment and whether recruitment is opt-out explain 85% of the variation
in uptake to a TOU tariﬀ.
We therefore recommend that demand for TOU tariﬀs is expressed
as a range, based on the minimum and maximummean recorded uptake
and expressed for opt-in and opt-out enrolment separately. Survey
measures could most usefully be viewed as indications of theoretical
potential, which in reality are likely to be highly optimistic unless
concerted action is taken to boost uptake.
Based on the available evidence, uptake to TOU tariﬀs is most likely
to fall between 1% (the lower bound estimate for mean uptake to
commercially available tariﬀs, most of which are oﬀered in the US) and
43% (the upper bound estimate for mean willingness to switch obtained
from surveys, most of which were run on nationally representative
samples of British energy bill payers), depending on how much eﬀort is
made to engage consumers with TOU tariﬀs to close the gap between
behavioural intentions and behavioural action [31–34]. If opt-out en-
rolment is used, uptake is most likely to exceed 57% but with an un-
certain upper limit of enrolment approaching 100%. It is not possible to
say whether uptake is likely to vary across countries, for the reasons set
out above.
Although the estimated range of TOU adoption rates under an opt-in
Fig. 3. Consumer measures of demand for TOU tariﬀs
by study type and default frame. Note: Each bar re-
presents a measure of uptake. Some studies obtained
multiple measures so individual studies may appear
multiple times. All studies used opt-in enrolment un-
less they are highlighted as having used opt-out. The
horizontal axis provides the bibliographic reference
for each study (see Table A.1 in the appendix for the
references).
15 For brevity, the result without ﬁxed eﬀects is not reported in Table 3Error!
Reference source not found.
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recruitment system is very wide, evidence from the literature on stated
and revealed preferences [31–34] and the real-world behavior of con-
sumers in the energy market [35] suggests that there is a strong risk
that uptake is more likely to fall at the lower rather than higher end of
the range presented above. Since the upper bound estimate of 43%
comes from surveys measuring how willing people are to adopt a TOU
tariﬀ, it is best interpreted as capturing the maximum potential national
uptake of TOU tariﬀs if every consumer who is willing to sign up to a
TOU tariﬀ at the time of the survey does indeed go on to sign up.
However, since it is well known that behavioural intentions are a re-
latively poor predictor of future behavioural action,16 it also follows
that a 40% adoption rate is unlikely to be achieved in reality unless
substantial eﬀorts are expended on encouraging switching. Consumer
inertia is a major problem around the world with the majority of con-
sumers having never left their home supplier since privatisation of retail
electricity markets began over two decades ago [35].
At the same time, we also acknowledge that it is not possible to
conclude with certainty whether observed diﬀerences in uptake be-
tween countries are due to genuine inter-country diﬀerences in con-
sumer demand for TOUs (i.e. that consumers in GB and Australia are
more in favour of TOU tariﬀs than consumers in the US) or due to
diﬀerences in measurement method. Diﬀerences in uptake measure-
ment method also overlap almost exactly with diﬀerences in the types
of populations sampled. Survey recruitment has mostly been nationally
representative [15,28,29] whereas participants solicited to take part in
TOU trials are, in many cases, very diﬀerent to the average energy bill
payer.17 Also, unlike for country, our model does not include separate
controls for diﬀerences in recruited populations because, in most cases,
non-nationally representative participant solicitation overlaps exactly
with measurement method itself. However, on balance, our judgement
is that it is highly unlikely that all of the variation in uptake across
surveys and commercially available tariﬀs is attributable to cross-
country variation in demand for TOU tariﬀs and is more likely to be
attributable to the fact that, for a variety of reasons, people are more
likely to express an intention to switch to a TOU tariﬀ than they are to
switch to one in reality.
4.2. The impact of tariﬀ design
As noted in [36], “diﬀerent approaches to DSR can achieve diﬀerent
beneﬁts for the network. While static tariﬀs allow regular peaks to be
managed, they cannot incentivize demand that follows variable supply
(such as from wind generation) or a response to unexpected peaks or
faults. Dynamic tariﬀs, on the other hand, do permit such ﬂexibility and
are therefore potentially more valuable to networks” [36], p. 80. It is
therefore important to understand whether there may be a gap between
what tariﬀs consumers are attracted to and tariﬀs that are most useful
for the electricity network.
The results suggest that real-time pricing tariﬀs, in which the price
of electricity can vary freely throughout the day according to real-time
supply and demand of electricity, are less popular than a static TOU
tariﬀ, in which the price bands apply for ﬁxed periods each day or
season. According to the results in Table 3, uptake to real-time pricing
tariﬀs is 13% lower (p < 0.01) than uptake to static TOU tariﬀs re-
gardless of whether recruitment is opt-in or opt-out and whether uptake
is hypothetical (measured in a survey) or actual (measured as trial re-
cruitment or uptake to a commercially available real time pricing
tariﬀ). This result is robust to several speciﬁcations, including a speci-
ﬁcation including ﬁxed eﬀects to control for potential correlation in
measures of uptake to real-time pricing tariﬀs that were obtained in the
same studies.
Dynamic TOU tariﬀs, in which the price of electricity varies, usually
within ﬁxed parameters, freely throughout the day, and capacity pri-
cing tariﬀs, are less popular than static TOU tariﬀs. The ﬁnding that
capacity pricing might be less popular amongst consumers than static
TOU is a relatively new one. However, the ﬁnding that real-time pricing
tariﬀs and dynamic tariﬀs are less popular is broadly consistent with the
results of individual studies which have systematically tested the im-
pact of tariﬀ design on uptake [15,17], including a study which was
excluded from the meta-analysis because the outcome measure could
not be standardised with those of other studies [18]. This aversion to
real time pricing tariﬀs may be due to their unpredictability and greater
complexity, for example, one study considered here which system-
atically tested the impact of tariﬀ design on uptake found that dynamic
TOU tariﬀs were rated consistently lower than static TOU tariﬀs for
perceived ease of use and control, even though overall willingness to
switch did not vary [15].
Although a number of other types of TOUs were captured during the
review, the results do not point to any consistent statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between static TOU tariﬀs and alternative designs such as
critical peak pricing, critical peak rebates and static TOU layered with
critical peak pricing and/or rebates. Compared to static TOU tariﬀs,
however, these tariﬀ designs were tested much less frequently, sug-
gesting that the sample size is not large enough to robustly test for
diﬀerences. This means that such tariﬀs may be more or less popular
than static TOU tariﬀs but that our data was not able to pick this up; or,
rather, the public have had insuﬃcient exposure to these alternative
tariﬀ designs to judge how they are likely to be perceived. Until further
evidence emerges, it is recommended that policymakers and re-
searchers assume that there will be no diﬀerence in uptake to critical
peak rebate programmes as compared to static TOU tariﬀs.
When it comes to critical peak pricing tariﬀs, policymakers may
wish to be guided by the results of three survey experiments which
found that signiﬁcantly fewer people were willing to switch to a critical
peak pricing tariﬀ as compared to a static time of use tariﬀ [28] and a
ﬂat-rate tariﬀ [17,23].
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, given that consumers are
likely to always have the choice between ﬂat-rate tariﬀs and TOU tar-
iﬀs, it is worth noting that in studies that have directly compared up-
take to ﬂat-rate tariﬀs and TOUs, uptake to the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ has been
signiﬁcantly higher [17,18].
4.3. Recruitment strategies to increase uptake to TOU tariﬀs
Given the low lower bound estimate of demand for TOU tariﬀs (1%)
– and the relative unpopularity of real-time pricing tariﬀs, which oﬀer
greater potential beneﬁts to the electricity system – it is important to
consider how uptake might be increased if the full beneﬁts of TOUs are
to be realised. To get a sense for how tariﬀ uptake might be increased,
meta-regression analysis was undertaken to help to obtain answers to
the following questions:
1. What is the correlation between uptake and making enrolment opt-
out rather than opt-in?
2. What is the correlation between uptake and bill protection?
3. What is the correlation between uptake and automation?
4. What is the correlation between uptake and oﬀering upfront cash
payment for signing up?
5. What is the correlation between uptake and telling people about
16 Unfortunately empirical studies testing the relationship between inten-
tions and behavioural action do not provide a clear picture of the strength of the
correlation between these two variables [34]. One meta-analysis ﬁnds that in-
tentions explain 28% of the variation in behavioural action [31] whereas an-
other reports frequency weighted average correlation between these two vari-
ables as 0.53, with a lower 95% conﬁdence limit of 0.15 and an upper limit of
0.92 [33].
17 For example, in cases where the overwhelming majority of people solicited
to participate have central air conditioning [24,57] or in cases where recruit-
ment to a TOU tariﬀ was undertaken amongst a pool of people who had already
consented to have a smart meter installed as part of their participation in an
earlier wave of the project [40].
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ﬁnancial savings from switching to a TOU tariﬀ?
6. What is the correlation between uptake and other types of message
framing, other than ﬁnancial messaging?
The studies provide strong evidence that opt-out enrolment in-
creases uptake because of the three trials which tested this approach,
two of them used a randomised control trial design with very large
sample sizes and robust designs [26,37]. Median enrolment rates under
opt-out policies are nearly four times higher than uptake under an opt-
in approach. The outlying 96% uptake in an opt-in study [24] is for a
US programme in which most customers had central air conditioning
that the programme allowed them to put on a timer to help avoid the
peak prices. The paper reporting these ﬁndings states that “the high
sign-up rate is directly attributed to an intense marketing eﬀort con-
sisting of: (1) an initial mailing to introduce the CCC™ programme; (2)
follow- up phone calls and door drop-oﬀs to arrange an in-person
meeting; and (3) subsequent workshops to answer questions.” [24], p.
899. However, a number of other trials [38–40] used similar recruit-
ment methods and did not achieve these high enrolment rates so it is
hard to explain why this programme was so successful and suggests it is
best treated as an anomaly. However, as argued elsewhere [41], opt-out
enrolment may not be the most appropriate recruitment strategy for
TOU tariﬀs. For example, there may be public acceptability concerns
around automatically switching people onto TOU tariﬀs, even if they
can opt-out because people who do not realise they have been switched
could face higher costs if they do not shift their electricity usage.
The studies provide some indication of the answers to #2- #4, once
also considering the results of individual survey studies that manipu-
lated the variables of interest experimentally. Providing small upfront
ﬁnancial payments (e.g. shopping vouchers [42] or small cash pay-
ments) is estimated to increase uptake by 22% in the meta-regression.
However, we cannot conﬁdently attribute the diﬀerences in uptake to
this cash incentive rather than other diﬀerences between studies that do
and do not use cash incentives because none of the studies compare
uptake to a tariﬀ when a cash incentive is oﬀered to a control group
that was not oﬀered a cash incentive.
The meta-regression revealed no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in uptake across studies in which the tariﬀ was oﬀered with bill pro-
tection or automation however we do not have enough data to be
highly conﬁdent that this means that bill protection and automation
have no eﬀect on uptake or whether too few studies oﬀered these fea-
tures to provide suﬃcient power to detect an eﬀect or because the
impact is being masked by other confounding variables given that very
few studies manipulated these factors experimentally. This is likely to
be because, as mentioned above, the focus on the literature so far has
been on whether tariﬀs change people's consumption patterns rather
than whether or why people would sign up to such a tariﬀ of their own
accord in the ﬁrst place.
Nevertheless, studies [17,18] which explicitly tested the impact of
automation on uptake do ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant increase in up-
take, with one study ﬁnding it increased willingness to switch by 4.5%
[17]. One study reported interaction eﬀects between automation and
tariﬀ type ﬁnding that automation made a dynamic TOU tariﬀ as
popular as a static TOU tariﬀ but that automation made no diﬀerence to
the attractiveness of the static tariﬀ [15]. The only study to explicitly
test the impact of bill protection on uptake, in which survey partici-
pants were randomly assigned to a number of TOU tariﬀs either with or
without bill protection, found that bill protection increased willingness
to switch to a TOU tariﬀ by 10% [17].
Questions #5-#6 are substantially harder to answer using existing
data because nearly all studies, apart from one [29], either tell people
the tariﬀ will save them money (a money frame) or do not specify what
frame was used at all. Two studies excluded from this review because it
was not possible to standardise their uptake measures [21,23] – in
addition to the study which was included [29] – found mixed results as
to the impact of telling consumers about the environmental beneﬁts of
TOU tariﬀs on uptake. Since nearly all energy tariﬀ marketing already
frames switching tariﬀ as a way of saving money, there is no evidence
as to whether changing this approach could increase uptake to TOU
tariﬀs, which, are likely to provide much lower savings than just
switching to the cheapest available ﬂat-rate tariﬀ.
4.4. Key limitations of the method
The review was as comprehensive as possible given the resources
available. However, it is possible that either the selection of search
terms or locations (e.g. some additional UK and US organisations were
scanned but not other countries) meant that certain documents were
missed. However, we assess the risk of having missed any major pro-
jects (which would have substantially aﬀected the results) as low.
The key protocol variation that may have been signiﬁcant for the
ﬁndings is that we designed the search to locate studies which speci-
ﬁcally set out to measure TOU uptake, but later expanded this to in-
clude recruitment metrics into larger TOU studies where the primary
aim was to measure demand response. While we believe that our search
strategy is likely to have identiﬁed reports of such studies which pro-
vided suﬃcient information on recruitment, it is possible that in-
formative studies may have been missed. However, there is no reason to
believe that the reasons for study inclusion would have led to sys-
tematic under- or over-estimation of uptake.
5. Conclusions and policy and research implications
5.1. Key ﬁndings
The key contribution of this systematized review is to synthesise a
wide range of evidence on demand for TOU tariﬀs from over 27 studies,
incorporating 66 individual measures of uptake to various TOUs in
diﬀerent countries, using diﬀerent recruitment methods and measured
in diﬀerent ways. The aim of the review was to identify the likely up-
take of TOUs amongst domestic energy consumers, and what factors
inﬂuence uptake.
The results indicate that uptake to TOU tariﬀs is most likely to fall
between 1% and 43%, depending on how much eﬀort is made to engage
consumers with TOU tariﬀs to overcome customer inertia and thereby
close the gap between behavioural intentions and behavioural action.
Since consumers rarely switch supplier, there is a high risk that opt-in
enrolment rates could fall substantially below 43% unless eﬀective re-
cruitment methods are found. We therefore strongly suggest that all
eﬀort is made to encourage consumers to adopt TOU tariﬀs to avoid the
risk of enrolment rates being closer to the lower bound conﬁdence limit
of 1%. If people are recruited onto TOU tariﬀs by default, uptake is
likely to exceed 57% and could approach 100%.
The measure of uptake does not account for variation in uptake over
time, and it is acknowledged that adoption of new tariﬀs is likely to be a
gradual process. However, this is the best available indicative range of
potential for future uptake to TOUs at this time. Since the majority of
the studies that met the inclusion criteria were run in United States,
Great Britain and Australia, it is recommended that policymakers apply
caution when attempting to apply these results beyond these countries.
The results of the meta-analysis provides good evidence that real-
time pricing tariﬀs and dynamic TOU tariﬀs are less preferred to static
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TOU tariﬀs. However, small sample sizes on other tariﬀs types means
that it is not possible to conclude whether other tariﬀ types (e.g. critical
peak rebates, inverse TOU) will be more or less popular than static
tariﬀs. There is some evidence from the results of individual studies
[17,23,28] to suggest that critical peak pricing tariﬀs will be less
popular amongst consumers than TOU tariﬀs and ﬂat-rate tariﬀs. The
results suggest that automation and bill protection are more likely than
not to increase uptake to TOU tariﬀs, but more research is required to
provide greater conﬁdence in these results.
5.2. Next steps for research
The wide range of uptake estimates described above means it is hard
for governments to plan on certain levels of TOU penetration. More
research is required to increase the precision of estimates and help
ensure countries can make realistic plans, and avoid falling short of
enrolment targets. For example, an enrolment rate of 1% (the lower
bound estimate from the meta-analysis) could have a substantial impact
on the UK Government's smart meter cost beneﬁt analysis, which relies
on uptake of 30% by 2030 [43]. More work is also needed to test the
impact of non-static tariﬀ designs on uptake to TOUs relative to static
tariﬀs. Critical peak rebates especially have the advantage that they are
non-punitive, in the sense that consumers can only ever be better oﬀ,
but not worse oﬀ by participating, which is attractive from a policy
perspective.
How can uptake estimates be made more precise? The review
highlighted a large gulf between the results obtained from surveys and
those obtained from studies in which people were able to switch to a
TOU. Given the lack of evidence of uptake based on actual switching
rates, it is strongly recommended that countries obtain a measure of
uptake based on recruitment rates to commercially available next-
generation TOUs. Where such commercial oﬀerings are not available,
innovative solutions will be required to undertake this research. In GB
[44] and Ireland [45], for example, the energy regulators have plans to
create a ‘regulatory sandbox’ that would permit suppliers to test new
oﬀerings amongst consumers prior to full launch. Alternative methods
which do not require the participation of an energy supplier are to run
trials in which the outcome measure is not switching itself but rather
proxies for switching or behavioural antecedents to switching, such as
willingness to engage with information about switching to a TOU.
Surveys will still have a useful role to play. They permit rapid testing
(under experimental conditions) of a wide range of tariﬀ and marketing
characteristics, helping to inform commercial product development.
With the exception of three survey experiments [15,17,29], the
studies considered in this review have not explicitly sought to test
methods of increasing uptake to TOUs that do not rely on opt-out en-
rolment. This is problematic because it means that it is not possible to
identify whether diﬀerences in design or marketing are causally related
to uptake. Where opt-out enrolment is politically unacceptable (due to
public concern and the risk of some people losing money [41]), pol-
icymakers may prefer to leave consumers to opt-in to TOU tariﬀ rates.
This review therefore highlights the need for experimental research on
how to encourage people to switch from a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ to a TOU
which aims to encourage self-selection of consumers best suited to DSR
whilst eliminating the major potential disadvantages of both opt-in
(sub-optimal uptake) and opt-out (passive, uninformed decision
making) methods. To enable robust causal inferences, this research
must involve the random assignment of participants to variations of the
same tariﬀ to test which variation results in higher switching rates as
argued by other authors too [16]. For example, the review provides
good evidence that small upfront cash payments are positively
correlated with uptake of TOUs. Future research could test this ex-
perimentally and could consider varying the size, timing and reward
type to test whether this has a causal impact on uptake.
The synthesis also indicates that automation and bill protection are
two promising strategies. The advantage of automation is that it can
also serve to increase potential customer savings, thus increasing the
total pool of people who could save money on a TOU. Automation re-
duces, and bill protection removes, the possibility that people could end
up paying more on a TOU than on their ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, and research
suggests that fear of losing money (loss-aversion) is associated with a
statistically signiﬁcant reduction in willingness to switch to a TOU tariﬀ
[29]. However, more research is required to establish whether bill
protection and/or automation does indeed have a causal impact on
uptake to TOU tariﬀs with higher levels of precision and statistical
conﬁdence than was possible at this point.
In particular, the synthesis highlights a substantial unexploited
opportunity to test the impact of diﬀerent types of message-framing on
uptake to TOUs. This is a very low-cost intervention that has had sig-
niﬁcant impacts in other domains including increasing registrations to
the organ donor register [46], enrolment into university [47] and en-
couraging timely payment of taxes [48] and ﬁnes [49]. There are many
diﬀerent ways of framing messages, and the literature to date has so far
only tested telling people about the ﬁnancial savings from switching to
a TOU. However, as this review suggests, the average savings are re-
latively modest which may explain why no evidence was found that
monetary messages were associated with an increased uptake. More-
over, evidence from ﬁelds such as social psychology [50,51], beha-
vioural economics [52] and sociology [53] suggests that people are
motivated by a wider range of considerations than just money, as
pointed out in another recent review article [54]. For example, mes-
saging could include the use of social norms, or tailoring of oﬀerings to
target consumer groups with electric heating or vehicles.
Finally, the synthesis also reveals several shortcomings in the re-
porting of results, which future research could address. For example,
this review identiﬁed studies that met all the inclusion criteria except
for that they did not provide information on recruitment e.g. [55,56];
future trials and studies which seek to measure the impact of TOUs on
demand proﬁles should report recruitment rates or at least provide
information that permits the calculation of recruitment rates (the total
number of participants solicited and the total number recruited). Trials
should also report on energy bill impacts where possible. Regulators
could consider inviting or requiring energy suppliers to inform them of
uptake to their commercially available TOUs so that this information
can be used to update government carbon strategies and smart meter
cost-beneﬁt analyses.
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